Role of Public Programs and a Natural Barrier in Relative Valuation of Households’ Storm-inflicted Health Outcomes under Optimal Private Defensive Strategies: Evidence from the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh by Mahmud, Sakib & Barbier, Edward
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Role of Public Programs and a Natural
Barrier in Relative Valuation of
Households’ Storm-inflicted Health
Outcomes under Optimal Private
Defensive Strategies: Evidence from the
Coastal Areas of Bangladesh
Sakib Mahmud and Edward Barbier
University of Wisconsin-Superior, University of Wyoming
2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60003/
MPRA Paper No. 60003, posted 18 November 2014 11:07 UTC
Working Paper  
 
1 
 
Role of Public Programs and a Natural Barrier in Relative 
Valuation of Households’ Storm-inflicted Health Outcomes under 
Optimal Private Defensive Strategies 
Evidence from the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh 
 
SAKIB MAHMUD  
Department of Business & Economics, University of Wisconsin-Superior  
Corresponding author: Tel: +1 715 718 0134; fax: +1 715 394 8180 
E-mail address: smahmud@uwsuper.edu (S. Mahmud) 
 
EDWARD B. BARBIER  
Department of Economics & Finance, University of Wyoming 
E-mail address: ebarbier@uwyo.edu (E. B. Barbier) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces a theoretical model that allows the estimation of a household’s valuation of 
health risks from major storms. An endogenous risk framework is developed in which the 
household can employ ex-ante self-protection and ex-post mitigating activities and treatments 
strategies to protect against storm-inflicted health problems. Combined with a health production 
function, our theoretical model reveals possible estimation methods to derive households’ 
marginal willingness to pay to reduce health risks due to an increase in public programs and the 
greater storm protection role of mangroves. Results show that these marginal willingness-to-pay 
measures can be derived without the expected utility terms since they are a function of only 
prices and technological parameters. Our empirical analysis of coastal households of Bangladesh 
impacted by 2007 Cyclone Sidr confirms the possible influence of mangroves in reducing storm-
inflicted injuries or illness. The probability of a household experiencing adverse health impacts 
from a major storm is higher if it has access to ex-post public disaster relief programs. However, 
there is no conclusive evidence of whether the likelihood of facing health impacts is higher if a 
household is located behind an embankment. Demographic characteristics such as age, number 
of females and number of children have considerable influence on the likelihood of a household 
facing storm-inflicted health impacts but not on medical expenditures for storm-inflicted injuries. 
To reduce damaging health outcomes from a major storm, results reveal that the households are 
willing to pay the highest amount for greater storm protection from mangroves followed by 
embankments and disaster relief programs.  
 
Key words: Self-protection; mitigating activities and treatments; storm-inflicted health 
outcomes; mangroves; Cyclone Sidr; Bangladesh.  
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1. Introduction 
Coastal areas with high population densities and widespread poverty are experiencing significant 
health risks as a result of frequent and severe storm events (IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). 
Government support to reduce health risks of such vulnerable coastal population usually come in 
the form of ex-ante (i.e. before the natural disaster) publicly constructed protective barriers or 
embankments and ex-post (i.e. after the natural disaster) public disaster relief and rehabilitation 
programs. Besides public programs, the presence of a natural barrier, such as a mangrove forest, 
can also play possible storm protection role with respect to saving lives. However, a poor coastal 
household's decision to engage in private defensive strategies to insulate themselves against 
storm-inflicted health risks might also be influenced by their expectation of receiving public 
protection programs and their location relative to the coast and the mangroves. The purpose of 
the following paper is to propose a theoretical model that allows estimation of a poor coastal 
household’s valuation of reducing storm-inflicted health risks in an environment where the 
household can pursue private defensive strategies given the presence of public programs and a 
natural barrier.  
 
Since private defensive strategies adopted by coastal households could reduce the probability and 
severity of storm-inflicted health problems, the storm surge risk becomes endogenous. The 
endogenous risk framework, first introduced by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), assumes risks can be 
reduced either privately or collectively through self-protection activities, which could reduce the 
likelihood of an undesired state, and through self-insurance activities, which could reduce the 
severity of the consequences if the undesired state is realized. For poor households in coastal 
areas of a developing country, such actions may take specific forms (Table 1).  Examples of self-
protection include converting a mud-built house to a brick-built house, raising the height of the 
homestead, planting trees around the house, and moving the house behind an embankment.  
These activities help reduce the risk that a household may face adverse health effects from a 
major coastal storm.  The household can also pursue self-insurance in terms of a set of mitigating 
activities and treatments in order to reduce the severity or magnitude of storm-inflicted injuries 
or diseases. These actions include taking medications and visiting a hospital or a doctor for 
medical treatment for illness or injuries (see Table 1). Hence, a household basically has two 
choices to protect its health from a storm event: the first choice is the set of ex-ante self-
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protection activities before the storm event, and the second choice is the set of ex-post mitigating 
activities and treatments in terms of self-insurance after the storm event.  
 
However, studies reveal that individuals have the tendency not to insure or protect themselves 
against natural disaster risks and outcomes when they believe help will be available from outside 
sources, either via public-sponsored programs or private charities (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; 
Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). Consequently, such help from outside sources might partially or 
fully crowd out private storm protection actions. In the disaster insurance literature, this tendency 
of a household to under-insure because of anticipated government or private charity support is 
called the ‘charity hazard’ (Lewis and Nickerson, 1989; Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Raschky and 
Weck-Hannemann, 2007).   It is possible that a similar crowding out effect might occur if a poor 
coastal household partially or fully reduces its private defensive actions because it expects 
increased government spending on disaster relief and rehabilitation programs after storms occur. 
 
The presence of mangroves and other “natural barriers” to storms may also influence private 
defensive strategies of poor coastal households. Various studies show that mangroves are 
effective in protecting life and property in coastal areas due to their ability to attenuate the waves 
caused by storm surges (Alongi, 2008; Barbier et al., 2008; Das and Vincent, 2009; Koch et al. 
2009; Wolanski, 2007). Therefore, households living in close proximity to mangroves might 
undertake different defensive actions in response to the perceived threat of a storm compared to 
households without such “natural barrier” protection.  
 
Considering the possible influence of public programs and mangroves on private defensive 
strategies, we explore the possibility of measuring the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay 
to protect its members’ health from a major storm if the household has better access to public 
programs and lives near to a mangrove forest. In order to examine these effects, we develop a 
theoretical model combining a household health production function with an endogenous risk 
framework that includes ex-ante self-protection to reduce the probability of storm-inflicted 
health impacts and the level of ex-post mitigating activities and treatments for each health 
outcome given any exposure to a storm. In addition, our model incorporates the possible 
Working Paper  
 
4 
 
influence of government disaster relief and rehabilitation programs and of natural storm barriers, 
such as mangroves, on private actions.  
 
The novel contribution of our paper is to suggest a theoretical model under an endogenous risk 
framework with the possibility of testing it empirically through a case study to estimate a 
household’s valuation of reducing its health risks from major storms. Results from our model 
show that a household’s valuation of reducing storm-inflicted health risks can be represented by 
the household’s marginal willingness to pay for an improvement in its access to public programs 
or for an improvement in its access to storm protection services of mangroves. A household can 
experience greater storm protection services from a mangrove forest if it moves in close to the 
forest or if there is expansion of the forest area. Following Bresnahan and Dickie (1995), results 
further reveal that these marginal willingness-to-pay estimates can be derived without the 
expected utility terms since they are a function of only prices and technological parameters.  
 
Our empirical analysis of coastal households of Bangladesh impacted by the 2007 Cyclone Sidr 
confirms the possible influence of mangroves in reducing storm-inflicted injuries or illness. 
Results show that the probability of a household experiencing more health-risks from a major 
storm is higher if the household has access to public disaster relief programs. However, the 
likelihood of household facing lower adverse health outcomes as a result of its location behind 
an embankment (a form of ex-ante public programs) is inconclusive. Demographic 
characteristics such as age, number of females, and number of children have considerable 
influence on the likelihood of a household facing storm-inflicted health risks but not on medical 
expenditures to storm-inflicted injuries. To reduce storm-inflicted health risks, results reveal that 
the households are willing to pay the highest for greater storm protection role of mangroves 
followed by ex-ante embankments and ex-post disaster relief programs.  
 
This paper makes a methodological contribution to the literature concerning the possible storm 
protection role of a mangrove forest with respect to reducing illness and injury. Our theoretical 
model differs from the damage function approach adopted by Badola and Hussein (2005), 
Barbier (2007), and Das and Vincent (2009) by introducing the household health production 
function within an endogenous risk framework. In addition, our model considers other factors 
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such as private defensive strategies and public programs that might also contribute towards 
reduction of storm-inflicted health risks. Preliminary empirical findings from the study confirm 
the positive influence of mangroves in reducing health-related risks from a major storm.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and the 
predictions derived from it. Section 3 explains the possible empirical model. Section 4 suggests 
future directions for the empirical research. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Health Production Model of Defensive Behavior 
Assume that a representative rural household located along the coastal area is exposed to an 
environmental risk in the form of a future cyclone-induced storm surge that could inflict various 
health problems. This environmental risk is endogenous because a household can take private 
defensive strategies to reduce its health-related risks from such major storms. Once a household 
is exposed to a major storm, we can define the health-related risks in terms of two 
characteristics: (1) the range of possible adverse health consequences, and (2) the probability 
distribution across health consequences. In this paper, we measure the adverse consequences in 
units that reflect the health consequences to people as a result of the storm surge event, such as 
the number of lost workdays and monetary losses for medication and visits to a hospital or a 
doctor for medical treatments. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that there is one 
adverse storm event and n states of nature. In a unified household model, the different states of 
nature reflect different health outcomes where reflects states of health that are ranked 
in descending level of health with 1 being the ‘best health’ state and N being the ‘worst health’ 
state. Since we are interested in the household’s defensive actions when it is fully exposed to a 
storm surge event, we do not consider non-storm states.  
 
Regarding defensive behavior, a household can employ a set of self-protection activities,
, that can decrease the probability of experiencing any health problems 
as the result of a major storm. In addition, the household can also employ a set of self-insurance 
activities in terms of mitigations and treatments,  with , that can reduce the 
severity of ex-post health problems once it is fully exposed to a storm event. For simplicity, the 
1, ,n N K
1 2  with , , ,
k
ij KZ k k k k K
t
ijT 1 2, ,..., tt t t t
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model does not consider the loss of life (risk of death) by assuming strict separability between 
mortality and morbidity.
1
   
 
Let us assume that a household chooses to incur private defensive expenditures to deal with any 
future storm-inflicted health-related risk. The household thinks that prior planning for these 
investments in terms of self-protection and self-insurance would be beneficial if it is fully 
exposed to a major storm event in the future. Considering these assumptions, a representative 
household  located in village  maximizes a utility function with the standard properties,   
     (1)  
where  is consumption expenditure, is the health outcome for the household in state ,  
and  signifies the exogenous socio-economic characteristics of the household and its location 
that may also affect utility. The model is structured as if the household maximizes a single state-
dependent utility function subject to a set of constraints that determine the household’s health 
production function and its full income budget.   
 
The probability of facing adverse health impacts for a household that is fully exposed to a major 
storm can be represented as      
                                                          (2) 
where  is the set of ex-ante self-protection activities that decrease the probability of facing 
health-related risks;
2
  is the household’s access to ex-ante public protective programs such as 
publicly constructed embankments or dams that reduce the probability of the household incurs 
flood damages;   is a vector of characteristics capturing the role of mangroves as natural 
storm protection barriers, such as the area of the nearby mangrove forest, distance between the 
                                                          
1
 A strict separability condition between mortality and morbidity is applied based on three (3) reasons: first, it is 
better to avoid double counting morbidity benefits, which is usually estimated through willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
and cost-of-illness methods; second, it is difficult for the respondents to comprehend and provide judgments if both 
morbidity and mortality outcomes were put in the same survey; and, last, it is generally thought that morbidity 
effects are of second order importance (Krupnick, 2007).  
2
 The model assumes that there are no interdependencies of self-protection among households.  That is, private self-
protection actions of a household will have no positive or negative externality impact on other households.  This 
suggests that there is no way a household can transfer the consequences of its self-protection actions to others.    
i j
( , ; )n n nij ij ij ij ijU U X H   1, ,n N  K
ijX
n
ijH n
ij
 
1 2
(.) ; , ,    
1, ,  and  , , ,
n n k
ij ij ij ij ij ij
k
Q Q Z G M C
n N k k k k

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k
ijZ k
ijG
ijM
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mangrove forest and the household, directional location of the household related to the coast and 
the mangroves, etc., and, lastly,  is a vector of characteristics defining the major storm event, 
such as storm surge height and wind velocity at household location, direction and distance of the 
cyclone path from the household location, etc.   
 
Considering that a household faces  health outcomes once it is fully exposed to a major storm 
event, its health production function can be defined as  
      (3) 
where  is the same set of  self-insurance activities that can reduce the severity of any storm-
inflicted injury or disease; and is the  household’s access to public post-disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs, some of which include health care for treating injuries and illness.  It is 
expected that health outcomes will improve if the household undertakes self-insurance and 
enjoys accessibility to public post-disaster programs. That is,   
 
If exposed to a storm event, a household incurs a minimum cost combination of medical care, 
lost wages, and consumption. This realized cost for a household that is fully exposed to a storm 
and facing adverse health impacts can be stated as  
   
  
     (4)                             
where the realized cost, , depends on the self-insurance activities , , and a 
household’s access to government post-disaster relief and rehabilitation programs  against a 
storm event, . It is expected that the cost is less if a household invests in self-insurance 
activities and has access to public protection programs. That is, 0;  0.
ij ij
t
ij ij
L L
T R
 
 
 
 
The household chooses the levels of self-protection, , and self-insurance, , by maximizing 
its utility given the following full income constraint:   
                              (5) 
ijC
n
 ;n n tij ij ij ijH H T R 1 2 1, ,   and , , , tn N t t t t   K K
t
ijT t
ijR
0 and, 0.
n n
ij ij
t
ij ij
H H
T R
 
 
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  1 2;           1, ,  and , ,...,n n tij ij ij ij tL L T R n N t t t t    K
n
ijL 1 2 with , , ,
t
ij tT t t t t K
ijR
k
ijZ
t
ijT
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1 1
;   
1, , ;  , , ;  and, , ,
k k t t n t
ij ij z ij T ij ij ij ij
k t
I X P Z P T L T R
n N k k k t t t
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     K K K
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Conceptually, the household income, , is equal to the non-labor income and wage income.  We 
assume  where  is a numeraire good which is normalized to a price of 1;  is the 
vector of prices of each  self-protection activity, where ; and  is the vector of 
prices of each self-insurance activity, where .  
 
Taking into account expressions (1)-(5), a household’s maximization problem is3 
    
,
1
 ; , , , ; ;
k t
N
n k n n t
Z T
n
Max EU Q Z G M C U X H T R 

  
   
Subject to,            (6) 
 
' '
;k k t t n tZ TI X P Z P T L T R       
where, 1,...,  n N states of nature; 1,..., kk k k self-protection activities; and 1,..., tt t t  self-
insurance activities.   
 
 
      
Expression (6) shows that a household maximizes its expected utility subject to the full income 
constraint considering only the health outcomes when it is fully exposed to a damaging storm.  
 
Substituting the income constraint and re-arranging terms, the household maximization problem 
(6) becomes 
    ' '
,
( ; , , ) ; , ; ;
k t
n k n k k t t n t n t
z T
Z T
n
Max EU Q Z M G C U I P Z P T L T R H T R        
 
       
(7)
 
 
Expression (7) says that the expected utility to be maximized is the sum of utilities under  
states of health of a household that is exposed to a severe storm event weighted by their 
respective probabilities.  
 
The first order condition with respect to the level of ex-ante self-protection, 
kZ , leads to 
 
                             (8) 
                                                          
3
 For ease of exposition, we omit the household index i and the village index j in the following steps.  
ijI
1XP  ijX
'k
zP
k
1, , kk k k K
't
TP
1, , tt t t K
n
'
Expected marginal benefits of self-protection Expected marginal costs of self-protection 
(.)
:   (.)  =
n n
n k n
zk k
n n
EU Q U
U P Q
Z Z I
  
  
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 
1 44 2 4 43 1 4 44 2 4 4 43
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Expression (8) reveals that a household will take self-protection actions until the probability of 
weighted expected marginal benefits of each self-protection activity equals its expected marginal 
costs.  By re-arranging terms, expression (8) can be further re-written as 
{
'
Unit cost of self-protection activities
Expected marginal benefits of self-protection
 
1
:     (.)
n
n k
zk k
n
EU Q
U P
Z Z
  
   
  

1 44 2 4 43
            (8.1) 
for all  self-protection activities and where  is the expected 
marginal utility of income. Expression (8.1) implies that at the optimum, the unit cost of self-
protection, , is equal to the expected marginal benefits of self-protection multiplied by the 
expected marginal utility of household income.  
 
Next, the first order condition with respect to the level of self-insurance, 
tT , leads to 
 
                  (9) 
Expression (9) reveals that a household will pursue self-insurance until the expected marginal 
benefits of each self-insurance activity equals its expected marginal costs.  By re-arranging 
terms, expression (9) can be further re-written as 
 
  (9.1) 
for all  self-insurance activities and where  is the expected 
marginal utility of income. Expression (9.1) implies that at the optimum, the unit cost of self-
insurance protection, , is equal to the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance multiplied 
by the expected marginal utility of household income.  
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2.1 Willingness-To-Pay 
We derive the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure for risk reductions based 
on positive changes from three different sources: (1) improvement in household’s access to 
storm protection services of mangroves, M , in terms of increase in area of the forest or decrease 
in the distance between the mangrove forest and the household; (2) improvement in household’s 
access to ex-ante public storm protection programs, G , which can be achieved if the government 
allocate more resources on  embankments or dams; and (3) improvement in household’s access 
to public  post-disaster relief and rehabilitation programs, R , through  guaranteed access or more 
availability of such public programs.   
  
A household can derive value for a decrease in the probability of facing storm-inflicted health 
problems resulting from an exogenous increase in the storm protection services of mangroves. 
This value can also be regarded as the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) of a household for 
reduction in the likelihood that it faces health-related impacts from a storm through its improved 
access to mangroves. The storm protection role of mangroves can be captured by the change in 
area of the nearby forest, change in the distance between the mangrove forest and household, or 
change in the directional location of the household related to the coast and the mangroves. The 
marginal WTP for a change in is solved by first totally differentiating the objective function 
expressed in (7), setting it equal to zero, substituting for the first-order conditions from (8) and 
(9), and letting . By following these sequential steps, the resulting WTP 
expression becomes 
                                                                                           (10) 
Similarly, the marginal willingness to pay for an increase in public protective spending,  G , can 
be derived by solving the objective function (7) with respect to , setting it equal to zero, 
substituting for the first-order conditions from (8) and (9) and considering .  
 
                                                (11) 
 
M
0dG dR dC  
1 n n
n
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U
M M
  
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
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Lastly, the marginal willingness to pay for an improvement in a household’s access to public 
sponsored health facilities, , once a damaging storm surge has occurred is 
 
                     (12) 
Expression (12) is derived after substituting for the first-order conditions from (3.8) and (3.9) 
and letting .   
 
Under equations (10)-(12), the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) expressions 
include unobservable expected marginal utility terms, which complicate empirical estimation. 
Assuming a spanning set of protection activities and employing rank condition of the matrix, 
Bresnahan and Dickie (1995) showed that marginal WTP estimates without expected utility 
terms can be derived in an exogenous risk framework where a household has access to multiple 
private protection activities. Later, Nastis and Crocker (2007) extended the technique to an 
endogenous risk framework to estimate parents’ valuation of their own and their children’s 
health for a reduction in the ambient level of health risks.  In the next section, we show how this 
same approach can be applied in order to derive the marginal WTP measures considering 
expressions (7) to (12) of our theoretical model.  
 
2.2 Rank Condition 
Following equations (10) and (11), the marginal willingness-to-pay measures contain a total of 
unknown utility terms, , for  health outcomes. However, in expression (3.12), 
the marginal willingness-to-pay contains a total of  unknown expected marginal utility ratios 
of  and . Our goal is to derive marginal WTP measures that are freed from these 
unknown utility or ratios of expected marginal utility terms so that it is possible to test our 
endogenous risk model empirically.  
 
In order to achieve this goal, we start with the expected utility maximization problem as stated 
under expression (7). For self-protection activities, , there are  first-order conditions 
R
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following expression (7). As shown in expression (8.1), these  first-order conditions can be 
considered as a system of  equations in unknowns since there are unknown utility terms,
. In matrix form, they can be stated as 
             (13) 
where ,  is the matrix containing the unknown utility terms, and is 
another matrix comprising the marginal products of .
4
  
 
A unique solution exists for the first-order conditions of  self-protection activities if and only if 
the rank of the matrix  is , which requires that .
5
 Then, the unknown utility 
terms can be recovered as,  
            (14) 
Conversely, for self-insurance activities, the  first-order conditions can be expressed as  
equations in  unknowns since there are unknown marginal expected utility terms, , 
and unknown marginal expected utility terms, .  
 
Following Bresnahan and Dickie (1995) again, the first-order conditions for self-insurance, , 
can be stated as 
           (15) 
                                                          
4
 The full derivation of expression (13) is shown in Appendix 1. 
5 This condition is suggested by Bresnahan and Dickie (1995) in their paper regarding the influence of household 
activities that offer protection against health hazards where risk is treated as exogenous. Nastis and Crocker (2007) 
adopted the same condition under their endogenous risk framework in estimating parent’s valuation of their own and 
their children’s health. According to Bresnahan and Dickie (1995), the rank condition requires that the number of 
nonlinearly related health protection actions to reduce health risks equals the number of health outcomes. If the 
requirement holds, then the choices from the spanning set of protective actions suffice to reveal preferences. 
Considering this perspective, Bresnahan and Dickie (1995) further suggest that the pervasiveness of markets or of 
substitution opportunities, rather than features of the technology like separability, determine whether willingness to 
pay is observed independently of preferences.  Using the same condition but under a different setup, Nastis and 
Crocker (2007) added that the effectiveness of each protection activity exhibits a strictly decreasing marginal 
product with respect to the intensity of use of the activity.  For example, intensity may be the temperature at which a 
meal is cooked. Higher temperatures kill more harmful food bacteria but at a decreasing rate.   
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where ,  is the matrix containing the expected marginal utility terms, 
and  is another matrix comprising the marginal products of with respect to health 
outcomes, , and the realized costs, , associated with the health outcomes.   
 
Again, a unique solution exists for the first-order conditions of  self-insurance activities if and 
only if the rank of the matrix  is , which requires that .
6
 Then, the 
unknown expected marginal utility terms can be recovered as 
          (16) 
Using (13)-(16), ex-ante marginal willingness to pay expressions (10)-(12) can be expressed as 
      
           (17) 
     
 
where  is the matrix of marginal products of the storm protection role of mangroves, M ,  
is a matrix of the marginal products of a household’s access to ex-post public health facilities 
as a form of disaster relief, R , and is a matrix containing the marginal products of ex-ante 
public protective programs, G .   
 
Substituting for  and in expressions under equation (17) can recover the marginal WTPs 
without the utility terms and the expected marginal utility ratios:  
                            (18) 
             (19) 
           (20) 
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For the above expressions (18-20) to hold, a separability assumption developed by Quiggin 
(1992; 2002) is not necessary to obtain the results, nor are the sufficient conditions listed in 
Corollary 1 suggested by Shogren and Crocker (1991).
7
 In addition, expressions (18)-(20) show 
ex-ante marginal WTPs as a function of prices and technological parameters only, i.e., they are 
independent of preferences.  
 
Equation (18) says that the ex-ante marginal willingness-to-pay for an increase in the storm 
protection role of mangroves, , for household health depends on the term , which is the 
vector of parameters capturing the ability of the mangroves to reduce the probability of facing 
health-related risks, , for a major storm in  states of health, multiplied by another term
, which is the marginal change in self-protection expenditures. The latter term is 
based on the multiplication between the vector of parameters capturing the influence of self-
protection activities on the probability of facing health-related risks for a damaging 
storm event in all possible states of nature, and the price of each self-protection activity, , 
where .  
 
Therefore, equation (18) shows that the ex-ante marginal willingness-to-pay for an increase in 
the storm protection role of mangroves, , requires information about the prices and 
technological parameters based on the role of self-protection, . It does not require information 
on the influence of self-protection, , on household preferences, . 
 
Likewise, equation (19) shows that the ex-ante marginal willingness-to-pay for an improvement 
in household access to ex-ante government protective spending, , depends on the term , 
which is the vector of parameters demonstrating the influence of ex-ante public programs  in 
                                                          
7 The separability assumption derived by Quiggin (1992, 2002) shows that smoothness of risk reduction 
technologies, as implied by and in this model, is the sufficient condition for the separation of risk 
attitudes from willingness-to-pay for ambient risk reduction. Condition (c) of Corollary 1 of Shogren and Crocker 
(1991, p.8) states that, “utility terms will not appear in ex ante willingness to pay expressions for endogenous risk 
changes if and only if states are discrete, ex post severity is independent of ex ante self-protection, and a unique self-
protection activity exists that exerts no cross-partial effects across states.”  
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reducing the probability of a household facing health-related problems   in all possible states 
of nature, multiplied by , which is the marginal change in self-protection 
expenditures.  
 
Equation (20) reveals that the ex-ante marginal willingness-to-pay for an improvement in 
household access to public health facilities , , depends on the term , which is the vector of 
parameters representing the role of public health facilities  in reducing  household realized cost 
 and improving  health outcome  , multiplied by another term , which is the 
marginal change in self-insurance expenditures.       
 
Hence, given the model assumptions, equations (18)-(20) reveal the following results.  
 
RESULT 1: For the storm protection role of mangroves, estimation of WTP requires 
information (1) on the prices or total expenditures of self-protection activities; (2) on the 
technological parameters that capture the role of self-protection activities in reducing the 
probability of facing storm-inflicted health risks; and (3) on technological parameters that reveal 
the storm protection role of mangroves in influencing the probability of a household facing 
health-related risks from a major storm event.  
 
RESULT 2: For ex-ante public programs, estimation of WTP requires information (1) on the 
prices or total expenditures of self-protection activities; (2) on the technological parameters that 
capture the role of self-protection activities in reducing the probability of facing storm-inflicted 
health risks; and (3) on technological parameters that reveal the influence of ex-ante public 
programs in reducing the probability of a household facing any storm-related health problems. 
 
RESULT 3: For public health facilities, estimation of WTP requires information (1) on the 
prices or total expenditures of self-insurance activities; (2) on the technological parameters that 
capture the role of public sponsored health facilities in reducing the realized health-related costs; 
and (3) on technological parameters that shows the possible influence of public sponsored health 
facilities in improving the health outcomes for a household exposed to a major storm.    
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In all the results, the WTPs can be expressed independently of preferences.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
We assumed in our theoretical model that health protection activities indirectly contribute to 
health outcomes by reducing the severity and probability of sickness and injury. Following the 
econometric specification suggested by Just and Pope (1978), it is possible to perform regression 
estimations based on the linear representations of the key variables.
 8
  
 
The linear representation of the probability of facing health problems, , as a result of being 
exposed to a damaging storm depends on the household’s total self-protection expenditure,  
k k
ZP Z , on the vector of characteristics capturing the storm protection role of mangroves, , on 
the ex-ante public programs, , on the vector of characteristics representing a severe storm 
event, , and on the socio-economic characteristics and the location of the household,  . If the 
state-dependent probabilities are mapped to the unit interval, then the linear representation can be 
represented as 
                           (21) 
In order to estimate the state-dependent realized cost, , associated with any kind of health-
related risk, a reduced form linear specification is suggested following Saha et al. (1997). This 
reduced form linear representation of the realized costs depends on the total self-insurance 
expenditure, 
t t
TP T , and on the socio-economic characteristics and the location of the household, 
.  
                           (22) 
where  is the heteroscadastic error term with , , and   
                                                          
8
 By considering risk rather than health outcomes, Just and Pope (1978) demonstrated that econometric estimates 
based on common specifications are uninformative with respect to risk since risk is not a direct input in the 
production function as it only indirectly affects output. In the paper, they showed that common specifications 
invalidate a number of postulates one would expect to hold for a production function with risk as an input. 
Considering this finding, they instead proposed a specification where some function of the inputs perturbs the effects 
of the disturbance term. The function along with the disturbance term appears additively in the production function. 
Nastis and Crocker (2007) suggested the same econometric specification to derive reduced-form linear equations of 
the main variables influencing the outcomes. Detail of the exposition can be found under Appendix 2. 
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                                         (22.1) 
The heteroscadastic error term, , depends on the gains of the health costs in terms of benefits, 
, received from access to public sponsored health facilities, . The qualitative effect of 
exogenous change in access to public health facilities is represented by .  
 
Lastly, the linear representation of the state-dependent reduced-form health technology of the 
household health depends on the self-protection expenditure, 
t t
TP T , on the access to public 
sponsored health facilities, , and on the socio-economic characteristics and location of the 
household, . 
                           (23) 
All the reduced-form equations (21)-(23) follow from the econometric specification suggested by 
Just and Pope (1978) and later applied by Saha et al. (1997) and Nastis and Crocker (2007).  
 
3.1 Estimation strategies  
For this paper, equations (21) to (23) are applied empirically to a case study of private defensive 
expenditure allocation to reduce storm-inflicted health risks from thirty-five (35) villages 
comprising 500 households in southwest coastal areas of Bangladesh. These areas were struck by 
a severe storm, known as Cyclone Sidr, on 15 November 2007. The case study area is divided 
into two categories. The first category is defined as the protected areas that are located behind 
the mangrove forest and in a clockwise direction from the track of Cyclone Sidr. The second 
category is defined as the non-protected areas that are not located behind the mangrove forest 
and are either in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction from the track of the storm. 
  
To accommodate limitations of the available data from the household survey, some empirical 
modifications are applied following the reduced form equations (21) through (23).  The 
probability of facing adverse health outcomes as a result of the storm,  , corresponds to the 
survey question that asks the respondent whether he or she thinks someone in the household is 
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sick or injured because of Cyclone Sidr.
9
 That is, equation (21) can be estimated using either 
probit or logit estimation. Realized costs, , represented by equations (22) and (22.1) can be 
identified based on medical expenditures and days lost associated with injury inflicted by storm 
surges from Cyclone Sidr. This can be employed based on either simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation or Tobit estimation. The latter estimation can be considered if the realized cost 
data turn out to be censored in nature. Lastly, household health status, , under equation (23) 
is linked to the survey questions regarding whether any member of the household has faced 
health issues such as injury, diarrhea, typhoid or severe fever, jaundice, malaria, pneumonia, skin 
disease, etc., as a result of being exposed to Cyclone Sidr. Again, probit or logit estimation can 
be applied for each health outcome.  
 
Putting together the reduced form equations and estimating them is both consistent and efficient. 
The identification requirements are met since there are more regressors than dependent variables 
and there is at least one regressor that is not included in the other regression equations. Measures 
of the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay for an improvement in health can be derived 
from these estimates. From equation (18), the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay for risk 
reduction in health as a result of an increase in the storm protection role of mangroves is 
equivalent to 
                               (24)  
From equation (19), the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay for risk reduction in health as a 
result of an increase in access to publicly constructed embankments is equivalent to 
           (25) 
 
                                                          
9
 The ideal situation would have been to get subjective probability data from each respondent of the household by 
directly asking question based on a contingent valuation method (CVM). But as the household survey was 
conducted with the revealed preference method, gathering subjective probability data on the household’s health 
status as a result of the household’s exposure to a damaging future storm event cannot be inferred.     
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Last, from equation (20), the household’s marginal willingness-to-pay for risk reduction in health 
as a result of an increase in access to public post-disaster relief and rehabilitation programs is 
equal to 
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        (26) 
 
4. Case Study Area and the Survey 
4.1 Study Area 
Meteorologists and researchers consider Cyclone Sidr, which made landfall on the south-western 
coastal areas of Bangladesh on 15
th
 November 2007 to be the most severe storm event to strike 
Bangladesh recently. It had a diameter of nearly 1000 km and sustained wind speed up to 240 km 
per hour accompanied by a maximum tidal surge height of 5.2 meters (or around 17 feet) in some 
affected areas (GOB, 2008). Although early warning systems contributed to successful 
evacuation of the coastal people which resulted in fewer human casualties, there was extensive 
damage to houses, live-stock, crops, and trees. In addition to the government-assisted early 
warning systems installed under the cyclone-preparedness program (CPP), one of the most 
significant factors to contribute to reduced loss of life and property in coastal areas was the 
Sundarban, the world’s largest mangrove forest (UNESCO and WCMC, 2008; Iftekhar and 
Saenger, 2008).
 10
  
 
Based on the location of Sundarban mangrove forest and the track of the Cyclone Sidr, we 
adopted the following procedure to designate and demarcate the study area: First, we selected an 
area located on the southwest coast of Bangladesh that falls under the high cyclone risk zone.
11
 
Applying Geographic Information Systems (GIS), we followed the track of the Cyclone Sidr and 
the position of the Sundarban mangrove forest in order to identify the areas that would be 
                                                          
10
 Although the Sundarban may have offered protection to many coastal communities, Cyclone Sidr also severely 
affected approximately 30,000 acres of forest resources while partially affected another 80,000 acres in the southeast 
Sundarban, thus causing estimated forest damages of US $ 145 million (GOB, 2008). 
11
 We selected the area based on the Saffir-Simpson tropical storm intensity scale developed by the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA).  Areas on the southwest coast and the entire Sundarban mangrove 
forest fall under the high risk zone. The map illustrating this division is available from the authors upon request. 
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suitable for the analysis (see Figure1). Using GIS, we identified both the protected (P) and the 
non-protected (NP) coastal areas.  We define as “protected” (P) any area that is located behind 
the Sundarban mangrove forest and is located in a clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr.  
Conversely, we define as “non-protected” (NP) any area that is not located behind the Sundarban 
mangrove forest and is in either a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr. 
We then applied ‘random area sampling’ to select the unions that fall under protected (P) and 
non-protected (NP) areas.
12
  The unions were chosen based on their location at an equal distance 
on either side along the track of Cyclone Sidr.  
 
Taking into consideration the fact that Bangladesh is most vulnerable to severe cyclone and 
storm surge events during the pre-monsoon (April-June) and post-monsoon (October-November) 
seasons, we conducted the household survey during the post-monsoon season.  Around 500 
households were surveyed from 35 villages in 18 unions using a weighted stratified random 
sampling method.  Out of the 18 unions, 8 unions fall under the protected areas while the rest fall 
under the non-protected areas.  We selected the households randomly from each union based on 
the Bangladesh Population Census Data.   
 
We conducted personal interviews with the head of the household using trained enumerators 
speaking the local language under our guidance and employing the questionnaire we developed. 
The questionnaires were pre-tested in October 2008, and the final survey was conducted in 
November, 2008.  Since we conducted the household survey within a year after Cyclone Sidr, we 
were able to obtain information, based on both actual records and recollections of the event, on 
household involvement in private self-protection activities to avoid the probability of storm-
inflicted health problems occurring along with self-insurance expenditures in terms of mitigation 
and treatments to reduce the severity any health problems caused by Cyclone Sidr. In addition, 
we collected information on important demographic and socio-economic characteristics of each 
household. We also obtained secondary data on the storm characteristics of Cyclone Sidr and 
additional geophysical information on the Sundarban mangrove forest.  
                                                          
12 The term ‘union’ refers to the lowest administrative unit in the rural areas of Bangladesh.  Administratively, 
Bangladesh has 6 divisions, 64 zilas, 508 upazilas and 4466 unions (Source: Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh, 
2009).  Under the Village Chaukidari Act of 1870, villages were grouped into unions to provide for a system of 
watches and wards in each village. 
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4.2 Household Characteristics in the Study Area  
Table 2 reveals the general demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 500 
households in the two case study areas, where 220 households fall under the protected area (P) 
and the rest fall under the non-protected area.  For the protected areas, males comprised 84.1% of 
the respondents, whereas, for non-protected areas, they accounted for 71.8%.  The average age of 
the respondents was around 42 to 43 years old.  52.1% of the respondents in the protected areas 
had completed primary school education, while it was 45.5% in the non-protected areas.  Less 
than 30% had secondary school education in both areas.  The average household size was five 
members in the protected areas, and six in the non-protected areas, which is approximately the 
national average household size in Bangladesh.  Nearly all the respondents (more than 90%) had 
been living in the same village since birth.   
 
Day labor is the most common occupation (36%) among households in the protected areas, and 
agriculture (40%) in non-protected areas. Business activities come second as an occupation in 
both case study areas representing 13-16% of the respondents.  In both areas, most of the 
households own the houses they live in.  Regarding the structure of the house, most house walls 
are made of wood while the roofs are made of tin or corrugated iron sheet.  More than 20 percent 
of the houses in non-protected areas are two storied; whereas, in the protected areas, less than 10 
percent of the total houses are two storied.  Less than 50 percent of the households in both study 
areas made any changes to their dwellings to reduce exposure to storm surge-inflicted damages 
although more than half believe that their houses face some storm damage risk due to their 
location at low elevations. Less than one third of the households have access to electricity while 
access to a cell phone use is close to 50%. In protected areas, most households obtain drinking 
water from ponds, canals, rivers, and preserved rain water, and in the non-protected areas, 
households rely on tube-wells, ponds, canals, and rivers.   
 
The average annual household income in the protected area was US $816 and US $858 in the 
non-protected area.  However, the average market value of assets (excluding house, land and 
pond) was nearly double for households in the non-protected areas (US $4,609) compared to 
households in the protected areas (US $2,802). The majority of the households that sustained 
damages from Cyclone Sidr have an average yearly income above US $1,450.
 
 In the survey, 
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self-protection expenditures were designated and measured by adding the approximate amount 
that a household invested to pursue each self-protection action. This information was based on a 
follow-up question to those households who responded affirmatively to the earlier question 
regarding whether they had pursued any self-protection actions to avoid Cyclone Sidr-inflicted 
damages to their property. The average amount spent on self-protection in the protected area was 
US $1,825 per household; whereas, in the non-protected areas it was US $768 per household.  
 
On the other hand, we could not directly determine the level of self-insurance expenditures due 
to data limitations. Instead, in the survey, self-insurance expenditures are proxied by taking into 
account the medical expenditures associated with the Cyclone Sidr-inflicted health damages and 
the approximate nominal value of the remittances received by households in order to deal with 
storm-inflicted property damages.
13
 Based on the results from our survey, the average 
expenditure on self-insurance in the protected area was US $93 per household, and in the non-
protected area, US $407 per household. However, not all the households surveyed engaged in 
self-protection and self-insurance. Our data reveals that among the households, only 22% 
participated in self-protection and 23% households in self-insurance.   
 
4.3 Health Data 
Table 3 summarizes households’ health-related problems as a result of Cyclone Sidr.  Out of 500 
households, total responses for the entire study area are: 241 injuries, 242 cases of diarrhea, 235 
of typhoid, 194 of jaundice, 181 of malaria, 184 of pneumonia, 175 of skin disease, and 144 of 
other diseases.  
 
Results show that households from the non-protected area are more vulnerable to storm-inflicted 
adverse health outcomes than households from the protected area. In addition, the average 
amount of money spent on medication for most Cyclone Sidr inflicted diseases is higher for the 
households from the non-protected area. In general, findings from descriptive statistics suggest 
that households that are located in the non-protected area are more exposed to adverse health 
                                                          
13
 Since studies by Yang and Choi (2007) and Clarke and Wallsten (2003) provide empirical evidence that 
remittances can be a vital source of income for people whose other forms of livelihood may have been destroyed by 
the natural disasters, we assume that both medical expenditures and the remittance received to deal with storm 
damages can be used as proxies for self-insurance. 
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outcomes from major storms. Alternatively, this indicates the possible natural storm protection 
role of mangroves in reducing morbidity.      
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Probability of facing Adverse Health Impacts  
Table 4 shows the summary statistics based on the means and standard deviations of the 
explanatory variables that are used for the regression analyses. Results of the regression 
estimates are based on the full sample of the household survey. Table 5 shows the probit 
estimation of the reduced form equation (18), which represents the probability of facing adverse 
health outcomes as a result of a household being exposed to a major storm event.  The table 
reports four regression specifications starting with a basic model (regression 1), which include as 
explanatory variables damages inflicted by Cyclone Sidr, pre-Cyclone Sidr household income, 
distance from the coast, asset holdings based on ownership of homestead, cropland, and pond 
area, and other socio-economic characteristics. For the other regression specifications, additional 
controls are progressively added starting with mangroves characteristics (regression 2), then, 
public programs (regression 3), and finally, the storm characteristics of Cyclone Sidr (regression 
4).   
 
The probit estimation is based on the survey question where the respondents were asked whether 
someone in the household had become sick or injured due to Cyclone Sidr. Although there are 
479 categorical responses to the status of health question, the total number of observations is 
small with only 107 households invested in self-protection. However, in spite of the small 
number of observations due to lack of data points, the overall goodness-of-fit test based on the 
likelihood ratio (LR) stat shows that the model is significant at the 5% level for all regression 
specifications.  
 
The estimation results suggest that a household that spends more on self-protection expenditures 
are also likely to face more health problems. Although not highly significant, this conflicting 
result might indicate that either there is inefficiency associated with the way the households 
reallocated their resources for self-protection or they are simply unlucky by falling directly into 
the path of Cyclone Sidr. Regarding the influence of income, the log and the square log of post-
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Cyclone Sidr income bear the negative and positive signs respectively, though they are not 
statistically significant under all regression specifications. This result might indicate that the 
probability of a household member becoming sick or injured from a major storm event has a U-
shaped relationship with income, initially decreasing, but then increasing. That is, both the low-
income and high-income households are more vulnerable to storm-inflicted health-related risks 
compared to the middle-income households.  
 
For low-income households, their vulnerability to storm-inflicted adverse health outcomes is 
exacerbated by various factors such as low wealth and income; lack of access to resources to 
cope with or adapt to natural disasters; settlement in desirable but more dangerous sites near 
coasts and floodplains that are frequently exposed to storm and flood events; lack of access to 
information and knowledge; poor housing quality; entitlement failure; resource dependency; low 
levels of community organization; lack of access to political power and representation; and 
beliefs and customs (Blaikie et al., 1994; Adger, 1999; Davis and Hall, 1999; Cutter et al., 2000; 
Rashid, 2000; Adger et al. 2003; McMichael, 2003; Few, 2007). For high-income households, it 
is possible that they might become more vulnerable if their living conditions significantly differ 
between pre- and post-disaster periods, which might make their self-protection strategies to 
protect their health against major storms difficult to implement compared to a middle-income 
household. In fact, some empirical studies reveal that non-poor individuals can be more 
vulnerable if they face large consumption changes as a result of their exposure to adverse shocks 
through economic crises and natural disasters (Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Dercon and Krishanan, 
2000; Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005; Dercon, 2005). However, studies also show that these 
richer individuals do not suddenly become poor since they can rely on their large asset holdings 
and higher income to address such adverse shocks (Dercon and Krishanan, 2000; Christiaensen 
and Subbarao, 2005).  
 
Among other socio-economic characteristics, probability of experiencing adverse health 
outcomes due to a storm event is more likely to be high for households having more female 
members and children. This result is also well documented in contemporary literature which 
shows that female members and children are more at risk to disasters in addition to the ageing 
population of the community (Blaike et al., 1994; Fordham, 1998; Bourque et al., 2006). 
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However, the influence of the number of children on households facing health-related risks as a 
result of a major storm is not statistically significant under all regression specifications. Although 
not significant, results also reveal that the probability of facing storm-inflicted adverse health 
impacts is U-shaped in age of the head of a household. This result is not surprising considering 
the existing literature which shows that elderly individuals are more vulnerable to natural 
disasters (Phifer et al., 1988; Balikie et al., 1994; Hajat et al., 2005; Bourque et al., 2006).     
 
With regard to the role of mangroves, households that fall into the non-protected area are more 
likely to become sick or injured as a result of a major storm event. This finding reaffirms results 
from Das and Vincent (2009) where they applied damage function approach on secondary data 
of 1999 Super Cyclone in Orissa, India to show possible influence of mangroves on saving lives.  
The coefficient of distance between the mangrove forest and the union where the household’s 
village is located remains positive and significant throughout all regression specifications. This 
again suggests that close proximity to a natural storm protection barrier may reduce the 
probability of facing storm-inflicted health problems. However, results from our study also show 
a household located to the south and southwest direction relative to the coast and the mangrove 
forest are likely to face more health-related risks compared to a household that is oriented 
differently. Since directional location relative to the Sundarban mangrove forest may determine 
how well the household is protected by this natural barrier, a household that faces in less 
favorable direction may be compelled to take more self-protection actions. This might reduce its 
vulnerability of facing more health related risks from a major storm.  
 
Whether or not a household is protected by an embankment appears to have no statistically 
significant impact on whether it is less likely to face adverse health outcomes from major storms.  
Regarding storm characteristics, households that fall into counter-clockwise direction of the 
Cyclone Sidr are more likely to experience storm-inflicted health problems. However, regression 
4 shows that none of the other storm characteristic variables are strongly significant in the model. 
Since one cannot predict the track of a future storm event irrespective of a household’s location 
and hence its potential impacts on health of the household members, these results should be 
taken with caution.   
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5.2 Realized Medical Expenses from Storm-inflicted Adverse Health Outcomes  
Based on expressions (22)-(22.1), Table 6 reports the simple ordinary-least-squares (OLS) 
estimation on the realized medical costs for a household as a result of Cyclone Sidr. Considering 
the highly skewed distributions of the data, the explanatory variables such as self-insurance 
expenditures and amount of total assets holding for the households were all transformed into 
logarithmic form. Starting with the initial model comprising socio-economic characteristics of 
the household, regression results show that the households who spend more on self-insurance are 
also the ones with higher medical expenditures. Considering the definition and types of self-
insurance of the theoretical model, i.e. mitigation activities and treatments, this result confirms 
that medical expenditures are an important determinant of households’ choice for self-insurance 
in order to reduce the severity of its health consequences when exposed to a major storm event. 
This variable remains positive and highly significant when ex-post public programs are 
progressively added to the initial model.    
 
Since self-insurance actions take place once a disaster occurs, we include a household’s income 
after the Cyclone Sidr event for our regression analysis. This seems logical considering that a 
household’s income can vary significantly between what it was before and after a major storm 
event. For instance, while a household’s pre-cyclone income might have come from subsistence 
agriculture, its post-cyclone income might come from day labor because the agriculture crops 
have been destroyed as a result of the cyclone. Our results show that there is low correlation 
either between the log of pre-income and log of post-income or between the square log of pre-
income and the square log of post-income. These correlation outcomes along with the t-tests 
confirm the difference between the sources of income before and after the Cyclone Sidr event.    
 
Regarding the influence of income, results show that the medical expenditure as a result of 
storm-inflicted health problems has an inverted U-shaped relationship with post-Cyclone Sidr 
income, initially increasing, but then declining (see Figure 2). Both the log and square log of 
post-Cyclone Sidr income remain highly significant bearing positive and negative signs 
respectively. This result might imply that middle-income households spend more on and allocate 
more for medical expenditures compared to low-and high-income households. This result 
suggests that because the middle-income households do not have the same access to public 
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sponsored health facilities as the poor (who are the primary recipients of aid) after a storm event, 
they invest more on medical expenditures. However, even though the middle-income households 
do take these financial steps in order to respond to a storm event, they are unlike high-income 
households that often own expensive storm-resistant homes or have medical insurance for any 
storm-related health problems. This finding from the household survey is consistent with what 
Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) discovered in the relationship between aggregate income and 
disaster damages at country level using a country-year panel data set. Their results reveal 
existence of a non-monotonic Kuznets inverted U-relationship where they argue that such a non-
linear relationship between aggregate incomes and disaster damages, where the risks first 
increases with income before they decrease, is a possibility if we consider behavioral changes 
among individual at the micro level in response to their increasing income. For example, these 
behavioral changes can be in terms of residents’ choice to locate in desirable but more dangerous 
sites near coasts and floodplains which are frequently exposed to storm and flood events.  
 
Among other socio-economic controls, the medical expenditure is high for younger heads of the 
households as well as for more female members’ households though these relationships are not 
significant under both regression specifications. Interestingly, results also show that households 
with more children incur lower realized medical costs. This counterintuitive result might be 
partly explained by a relatively richer household’s choice to increase its production of child 
services through child quality by increasing its resource investment in existing children 
compared to a lower-income household (Becker and Lewis, 1973; De Tray, 1974; Willis, 1987; 
Becker, 1991).   
 
Regarding ex-post public programs, results reveal that households with access to public post-
disaster rehabilitation programs spend less on medical expenditures. Although not statistically 
significant, this result might imply that access to ex-post public disaster rehabilitation programs 
act as substitutes for private medical expenditures (Rask & Rask, 2000). However, households’ 
access to public disaster relief program turns out to have complementary relationship with 
private medical expenditures. 
14
 
                                                          
14
 Regression specification error test (RESET) suggests that there is no omitted variable bias after inclusion of these 
ex-post public programs. 
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5.3 Probit Model for Experiencing Storm-inflicted Injury 
Table 7 reports the probit model for experiencing storm-inflicted injury considering equation 
(23). Contrary to the previous findings, estimation results reveal that households who spend 
more on self-insurance expenditures are more likely to face a storm-inflicted injury. This result 
confirms that storm-inflicted injury is an important determinant for a household to allocate a 
significant portion in self-insurance in terms of ex-post mitigation activities and treatments. 
Regarding influence of income, the log and square log of post-Cyclone Sidr income reveal 
negative and positive signs respectively though they are not statistically significant in all 
regression specifications. Like the previous analysis on the probit estimation on health-risks, the 
probability of a household member with a storm-inflicted injury has a U-shaped relationship with 
income, initially declining, but then increasing. This might suggest that the low-income and 
high-income households are more vulnerable to an injury as a result of a major storm event 
compared to the middle-income households.  
 
In the first regression specification without inclusion of the public programs, regression 
estimates show that coefficient of ownership of homestead, cropland, and pond area – a form of 
assets holding – is positive and significant at 5% level. However, when the public programs 
variables such as access to relief and rehabilitation programs are added to the model, the 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Among other socio-economic variables, results 
show that the probability of a household experiencing storm-inflicted injury has a U-shaped 
relationship with age, with the relationship between injury and age initially declining, but then 
increasing. Although not significant, this result implies that an older head of a household is more 
likely to suffer health problems from major storms compared to a younger head of a household. 
In other words, the likelihood of suffering from storm-inflicted injury increases with age. Results 
also reveal that the likelihood of facing injuries due to a storm event is higher for households 
having fewer female and child inhabitants though these findings are not significant in both 
regression specifications. 
 
Regarding public programs, households that received government assistance through public 
disaster relief programs are more likely the ones who faced injuries due to a major storm. This 
finding is logically consistent with the fact that the government usually targets those households 
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that are deemed most vulnerable to natural disasters. In addition, results also show that the 
probability of a household experiencing storm-inflicted injury is more likely to decrease if it has 
access to public sponsored rehabilitation programs. Since access to these programs indirectly 
affects the well-being of a household’s consumption smoothing behavior through the provision 
of construction materials for housing and seeds, fertilizers, and fingerlings for farming, it is 
possible that such programs are targeted for those households that had incurred significant storm-
inflicted property damages but were physically more able to recuperate those damages through 
their productive activities.  
 
5.4 Marginal Willingness-to-pay 
Following expressions (24)-(26), Table 8 reveals marginal willingness-to-pays (MWTPs) for 
reduction in health-related risks. These MWTPs are generated through changes in three key 
variables: (i) households’ living in close proximity to mangroves; (ii) households’ access to 
publicly constructed embankments; and (iii) households’ access to public post-disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs.  
 
To calculate MWTPs, values of the marginal effects that are suggested in expressions (24) to 
(26), are obtained based on econometric estimations of (21) to (23). These values are then 
multiplied with the average nominal value of households’ self-protection and self-insurance 
expenditures in order to derive MWTPs per household. Results reveal that a household MWTP is 
highest for a greater storm protection role of mangroves, which is equivalent to Taka 3,372.23 or 
US $ 48.87. For the entire study area, approximate values of the MWTPs could be computed by 
multiplying the MWTP per household with the entire population in the study area which is 
around 3.69 million at the time of the survey.  
 
Since the descriptive analyses of the study shows that storm-inflicted health-related problems are 
lower in the mangrove protected areas, it is not surprising to find the higher marginal willingness 
to pay value for reducing storm-inflicted health-related risks due to greater storm protection role 
of mangroves. This finding suggests that households reveal possible storm protection role of 
mangroves based on their previous encounters with major storms and hence they are willing to 
pay more for better storm protection services from mangroves. For public programs, we argue 
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that households prefer access to publicly constructed embankments over ex-post disaster relief 
programs because they put more weight on reducing the likelihood rather than the severity to 
storm-inflicted health-related problems.  
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Recent climate change reports reveal that while severity of cyclones caused by climate change is 
happening on a global scale, coastal areas with high population density and abject poverty might 
experience more health-related impacts in terms of increasing mortality and morbidity due to 
future cyclone and storm surge events. Facing such adverse health outcomes from major storms, 
a household might be forced to allocate its resources in private storm protection activities despite 
its limited capacity and access to public storm protective programs and a possible natural storm 
protection barrier such as the mangrove forest.  
     
Regarding private storm protection actions, the study focuses on two types of actions: (1) self-
protection, a form of prevention, where the households’ private investments are made to reduce 
the likelihood (probability or risk) that a household will face adverse health impacts from a 
major storm; and (2) self-insurance, a form of adaptation, where households’ private 
expenditures in terms of mitigation activities and treatments are used to reduce the adverse 
impacts, or severity, of any such health outcomes if they occur. However, existing literature 
reveals that the level of private storm protection investment might differ among households 
because of the expectation of public protective programs, and location of the household relative 
to the coast and natural coastal barriers.  Considering these factors, the main objective of this 
paper is to see whether private response to reduce health impacts from future cyclone-induced 
storm surges is significantly lower in areas where households have greater access to public 
programs and live in close proximity to mangroves. Findings from this study have policy 
implications regarding how disaster relief and rehabilitation aid should be allocated more 
efficiently to best serve the affected households.     
  
To fulfill the research objective, this paper demonstrates a theoretical model that combines 
household health production function with an endogenous risk framework where households 
choose self-protection and self-insurance to reduce the likelihood as well as the severity of its 
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storm-inflicted adverse health outcomes. Given certain assumptions, results from the model 
reveal possible estimation methods to derive households’ ex-ante marginal willingness to pay for 
reducing health risks due to an increase in public programs and the greater storm protection role 
of mangroves. One of the novel contributions of the paper in the health and the endogenous risk 
literature is to show that these marginal willingness-to-pay measures can be derived without the 
expected utility terms, i.e., they are function of only prices and technological parameters. As a 
result, the theoretical model can be tested empirically tested to measure the marginal willingness-
to-pay estimates using household survey data. By introducing this method which is different 
from the damage function approach taken by Badola and Hussein (2005), Barbier (2007), and 
Das and Vincent (2009), this paper also contributes to literature about the storm protection role 
of mangroves in order to determine whether mangrove forests provide protection to lives that are 
at risk from severe and damaging storm events.  
 
For the empirical analysis, the household survey data is based on a case study comprising 500 
households among 35 villages in the southwest coastal areas of Bangladesh focusing on the 
aftermath of Cyclone Sidr, which made landfall on November 15, 2007. The case study area is 
divided into two categories. The first category is defined as the protected areas that are located 
behind the mangrove forest but fall into clockwise direction from the track of the Cyclone Sidr. 
The second category is defined as the non-protected areas that are not located behind the 
mangrove forest and fall either clockwise or counterclockwise direction from the track of the 
Cyclone Sidr. 
 
Descriptive statistics and empirical results on the full sample of the case study area reveal: (i) 
households that spend more on self-protection are also likely to face more health related 
problems. This confounding result might indicate that either there is inefficiency regarding the 
ways the households reallocate their resources for self-protection or they are simply unlucky by 
falling directly into the path of Cyclone Sidr; (ii) there is a U-shaped relationship between the 
probability of a household member facing storm-inflicted health problems and its income. This 
might imply that the low-income and higher-income households are more vulnerable to storm-
inflicted health risks compared to the middle-income households; (iii) results confirm the 
possible influence of mangroves in reducing storm-inflicted injuries and diseases; (iv) medical 
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expenditures due to storm-inflicted health problems are an important determinant of households’ 
choice for self-insurance; (v) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the post-
Cyclone Sidr income and medical expenditures due to storm-inflicted health problems. This 
finding might suggests that once a household member is exposed to a storm-inflicted health 
problem, the middle-income households invests more in medical expenses compared to low-
income and higher-income households; (vi) for publicly constructed embankments, results show 
inconclusive evidence about whether the probability of experiencing more health-risks from a 
major storm is lower for those households that live inside the embankment; (vii) for ex-post 
public programs, households that received government assistance through public disaster relief 
programs are more likely to incur storm-inflicted injuries. This finding is logically consistent 
with the fact that the government usually targets those households that are deemed most 
vulnerable to natural disasters; and (viii) demographic characterizes such as respondent’s age, 
number of females and children have considerable influence on the likelihood of a household 
facing storm-inflicted health risks but not on medical expenditures to storm-inflicted injuries.      
     
Regarding marginal willingness to pay measures for reducing health risks, results reveal that 
households are willing to pay the highest for greater storm protection role of mangroves. This is 
followed by households’ marginal willingness to pay for ex-ante public programs such as access 
to embankments and ex-post public programs such as access to public sponsored disaster relief 
programs. These results are not surprising considering the descriptive analyses of the study 
which show that storm-inflicted health-related problems are lower in the mangrove protected 
areas. It seems from the marginal willingness to pay estimates, households acknowledge this fact 
and hence they are willing to pay more for better storm protection services from mangroves. For 
public programs, we argue that households prefer access to ex-ante embankments over ex-post 
disaster relief programs because they put more weight on reducing the likelihood rather than the 
severity to storm-inflicted health-related problems.  
 
Based on the households’ preference for more ex-ante storm protection measures, such as 
publicly constructed embankments and the presence of a natural barrier, this paper suggests that 
the government should collaborate with the local stakeholders in order to come up with an 
efficient tree plantation program along the coast by classifying trees other than mangroves that 
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can play a significant storm protection role in saving lives and reducing storm-inflicted health-
related problems. Since a post Tsunami analysis in Sri Lanka by Feagin et al. (2009) reveals that 
plantation of mangroves around the vulnerable coastline in inappropriate environmental settings 
might reduce long-term ecological sustainability in the targeted coastal areas, it is appropriate for 
the government to take all the factors into account before implementing such project. Moreover, 
the government should also consider the combination of having both mangroves and 
embankments in order to protect the latter from breaches as a result of a major storm event. Such 
a program might have the capacity to save more lives and reduce other storm-inflicted health-
related risks. However, considering the uncertainties surrounding the extent of the storm 
protection role of mangroves from tidal waves that are too extreme in magnitude (Montgomery, 
2006; Braatz et al., 2007; Forbes and Broadhead, 2007; Alongi, 2008; Cochard et al., 2008) and 
the government’s own capacity to protect the coastal communities from intense storm events 
(World Bank, 2010), it is justifiable for the government to encourage more collective and 
individual participation in private storm protection actions.  
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Appendix 1 
Under endogenous storm surge risk model to reduce health damages through private activities, the first order 
conditions that are shown in matrix form in equation (12), can be derived by the following steps:  
First order condition in equation (8.1) with respect to level of self-protection activities 
k
ijZ  is  
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    is the expected marginal 
utility of income.    
 
Rearranging terms, the first order condition of (8.1) can be written in matrix form as 
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The vectors can be written as 
    
k
Z zP            (A.1.2) 
 
where Z  is the vector of parameters that can be empirically estimated; 1  is the vector of variables that includes 
the utility terms including the marginal utility of income  ; and,  1 , , kkkkz Z ZP P P K is the price of each self-
protection activity for a system of k equations.  
 
Expression (A.1.2) contains a total of N unknown utility terms based on 1, ,n N K  states of health. Applying 
established results from linear algebra, a unique solution exists for the first-order conditions if and only if the rank of 
the matrix Z is  ZR N  , which requires that k N . Then the unknown utility terms can be expressed as 
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k
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Now, the first order condition in equation (9.1) with respect to level of self-protection activities 
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of income.    
 
Rearranging terms, the first order condition of (9.1) can be written in matrix form as 
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The vectors can be written as 
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where T
  , 1,2  is the vector of parameters that can be empirically estimated and v , 1,2v   is the vector of 
variables that includes the utility terms including the marginal utility of income  ; and,  1 , , ttttT T TP P P K is the 
price of each self-insurance activity. This system of t equations can be further written as 
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More precisely,    2
t
T TP            (A.1.7)  
 
 
Expression (A.1.7) contains a total of 2N unknown utility terms based on 1, ,n N K  states of health. Using 
well-known results from linear algebra, a unique solution exists for the first-order conditions if and only if the rank 
of the matrix T is   2TR N  , which requires that 2k N . Then the unknown utility terms can be 
expressed as 
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To derive ex ante marginal willingness to pay measures for an increase in storm protection role of mangroves to 
reduce the probability and the severity of the health loss is the marginal change of income that holds expected utility 
constant. This can be found by totally differentiating the objective function (7) with respect to ijM , setting it equal 
to zero, substituting for the first order conditions from equations (8) and (9) with respect to 
k
ijZ  and 
t
ijT , and letting 
0ij ij ijdG dR dC   .  
 
1
n
ij ij n
ij
nij ij
I Q
U
M M
  
    
   
   
This can be further written as,  
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which can be further reduced to 
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Similarly, for ex ante public protective programs, the ex-ante marginal willingness to pay can be derived by totally 
differentiating the objective function (7) with respect to ijG , setting it equal to zero, substituting for the first order 
conditions from equations (8) and (9) with respect to 
k
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t
ijT , and letting 0ij ij ijdM dR dC   .  
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which can be further reduced to 
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Lastly, for ex post public assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs, the ex-ante marginal willingness to pay 
can be derived by totally differentiating the objective function (7) with respect to ijR , setting it equal to zero, 
substituting for the first order conditions from equations (8) and (9) with respect to 
k
ijZ  and 
t
ijT , and letting 
0ij ij ijdM dG dC   .  
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   
This can be written as 
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
          
N N
N N
N N
N
U U
Q Q
H I
I H H L L
R R R R R
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 
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                 (A.1.13) 
which can be further reduced to 
1 2
1 2R R
I
R
 

    

 
11 2
2
2
'
1
R R
R
t
R T T
I
R
I
R
I
P
R
 

 
          
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

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     (A.1.14) 
Appendix 2 
Just and Pope (1978) were first to suggest the idea that formulations of stochastic production functions are very 
restrictive for cases where risk is an important input. They showed in their paper that common specifications 
invalidate number of postulates one would expect to hold for a production function with risk as an input. Thus, 
econometric estimates based on these common specifications turn out to be uninformative with respect to risk. 
Because, risk is not a direct input in the production function; hence, it indirectly affects the output. Based on these 
assumptions, Just and Pope (1978) proposed an econometric specification where some function of the input, say  
 g X , perturbs the effects of the disturbance term, say  . They consider the newly defined term to appear 
additively in the production function, say y .  
   
    2where, 0,  
y f X g X
E Var 

  
  
 
                (A.2.1) 
 
Just and Pope (1978) suggested that any special case for which  f X  satisfies the standard requirements for a 
production function and  g X  to be linearly homogenous should hold for the above specification.  
 
Extending to observation t , equation (A.2.1) can be shown as 
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 
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                              (A.2.2)   
 
Taking logs, equation (A.2.2) becomes 
 
 
 
,
ln ln , ln 1
,
t
t t t
t
g Z
y f V
f Z

 

 
    
 
                 (A.2.3) 
According to Just and Pope (1978), this function can be consistently estimated using maximum likelihood.  
 
For the endogenous health risk model, activities of health protection adopted by the household (i.e. risk in Just and 
Pope, 1978) indirectly contribute to health outcomes (i.e. output  in Just and Pope, 1978) by reducing the likelihood 
and the severity of a bad health outcome as a result of a damaging storm surge event.  
 
Following some previous applications of Just and Pope (1978) technique (Saha et al.1997; Nastis & Crocker, 2007), 
the linear representation of the state dependent realized cost function 
nL  in equation (3.22) can be estimated as 
 '1 2 3n t tTL P T                            (A.2.4) 
where B e    , is the heteroscadastic error term with  0,1 , and   ,1e : .  
Also,  
1 2B R                                      (A.2.5) 
 
The coefficient 
'
2 is the effect of the self-insurance expenditures in terms of medical expenditures and treatment 
costs, lost working days, etc., on the realized costs
nL  , and the coefficient 3  is the effect of socio-economic status 
and location of the household on its health costs. Heteroscadastic error term   depends on the gains in health costs 
in terms of benefits, B , received from a household’s access to public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs, .
R . The qualitative effect of exogenous change in access to public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs is 
represented by 2 .    
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: The Study Area – The Protected and Non-Protected Areas 
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Figure 2: Inverted U-shaped Kuznets Curve between Medical Expenditures and Household 
Income 
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Table 1: Self-protection and self-insurance actions in reducing health-related risks and impacts 
from major storms in coastal areas of Bangladesh 
Examples of private self-protection affecting the  
probability of facing health impacts from major 
storms 
Examples of private self-insurance in terms of 
mitigation activities and treatments to reduce 
exposure to adverse health effects from major 
storms 
 Converting mud built house to brick built 
house 
 Raising height of the homestead 
 Moving house inside embankment 
 Planting trees around the house 
 Purchasing medications 
 Visiting a doctor or hospital 
 Taking time off from work to recuperate from 
injuries 
 
Source: Reconnaissance Survey, November 2008  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Household based on the Study Area 
Household Characteristics Value 
Protected  Non-protected 
Respondent average age (mean) 
Respondent gender (%) 
 
Literacy rate of Respondent (%) 
 
 
Respondent Occupation (%) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent is head of household (%) 
Respondent living in the village since birth (%) 
Average number of family members (Min-Max) 
Average number of adults (Min-Max) 
Average number of children (Min-Max) 
Average number of males at work (Min-Max) 
Type of wall used for dwelling at present (%) 
 
 
 
 
Type of roof used for dwelling at present (%)  
 
 
 
 
Nature of house in past (%) 
Floors of house at present (%) 
 
Tenure of residence (%) 
 
Elevation status of the house (%) 
 
 
Size of homestead (Mean in hectare) 
Type of latrine (%) 
 
 
Source of drinking water – multiple responses 
(%) 
 
 
 
Percentage with electricity connection 
Percentage with access to cell phone  
Average household income (US $ /year) 
Average per capita income (US $ /year) 
Main source of energy- multiple responses (%) 
 
 
Male 
Female 
Illiterate 
Primary School 
High School 
Farmer 
Fisherman 
Trader 
Service  
Wage worker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Katcha/ Earthen 
Tin/ C.I. Sheet 
Pacca (brick) 
Wood 
Jhupri/ Chon 
Katcha/ Earthen 
Tin/ C.I. Sheet 
Pacca (brick) 
Wood 
Jhupri/ Chon 
Same 
Ground floor 
Up to first floor 
Rented 
Owned 
High land 
Mid land 
Low land 
 
Sanitary 
Ring/slab 
Katcha 
Deep Tube well 
Tube well 
Pond/ River 
Rain water  
Filtered Pond 
 
 
 
 
Wood/ Coal 
Twigs/ Leafs 
42.89 
84.09 
15.91 
7.83 
52.07 
26.73 
24.09 
6.82 
15.91 
6.36 
35.91 
81.36 
91.82 
4.97 (1-11) 
3.68 (1-10) 
1.89 (1-7) 
1.33 (1-4) 
18.26 
21.46 
9.13 
37.44 
10.50 
0.46 
73.97 
2.28 
4.57 
18.72 
52.51 
90.91 
9.09 
3.67 
89.45 
6.82 
37.27 
55.91 
0.13 ha 
7.73 
83.18 
9.55 
0.45 
12.27 
67.73 
48.64 
24.09 
21.46 
48.18 
815.47 
167.00 
93.52 
83.80 
41.69 
71.79 
28.21 
8.36 
45.45 
27.27 
39.78 
7.17 
13.26 
6.45 
11.93 
63.08 
90.68 
5.66 (0-25) 
4.43 (1-15) 
1.72 (1-10) 
1.55 (1-7) 
5.02 
46.58 
11.42 
42.92 
17.35 
1.07 
80.71 
1.79 
2.50 
13.93 
74.29 
78.85 
21.15 
3.94 
92.11 
5.00 
41.07 
53.93 
0.14 ha 
21.94 
64.03 
12.95 
26.43 
33.57 
31.79 
15.36 
11.79 
31.79 
45.16 
857.19 
200.50 
98.55 
61.82 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Households’ Health-related Problems due to Cyclone Sidr 
Type of 
disease 
Study area No. of responses Average number 
of days suffering 
Average amount spent 
in medication (in Tk.) Yes No Total 
Injury Protected 66 37 103 125.8 5944.44 
Non-protected 72 69 141 75.61 8848.59 
Entire area 138 106 244 99.23 7483.21 
Diarrhea Protected 28 70 98 10.54 1583.33 
Non-protected 29 115 144 8.17 1710.71 
Entire area 57 185 242 9.33 1648.18 
Typhoid Protected 67 19 86 24.55 1209.70 
Non-protected 89 60 149 25.82 2345.45 
Entire area 156 79 235 25.28 1854.52 
Jaundice Protected 9 56 65 40.00 2537.50 
Non-protected 10 119 129 53.50 3232.00 
Entire area 19 175 194 47.94 2923.33 
Malaria Protected 1 60 61 - - 
Non-protected 2 118 120 11.00 2250.00 
Entire area 3 178 181 11.00 2250.00 
Pneumonia Protected 14 50 64 71.08 3423.08 
Non-protected 7 113 120 44.25 2768.75 
Entire area 21 163 184 60.35 3173.81 
Skin Disease Protected 16 42 58 136.79 1200.00 
Non-protected 20 97 117 138.55 6552.50 
Entire area 36 139 175 137.82 4348.53 
Others  Protected 12 42 54 214.36 10808.33 
Non-protected 11 79 90 233.90 13510.00 
Entire area 23 121 144 223.67 12036.36 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the Key variables used for Regression Analysis 
Variable Definition No. of 
obs. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variables  
HEALTH If any household member is facing Cyclone 
Sidr-inflicted health-risks (=1, 0 otherwise)   
479 0.616 0.487 
L(HEALTHCOST) Medical expenditures on Cyclone Sidr-
inflicted health losses (in Tk.) 
304 7.836 1.39 
INJURY If any household member is facing Cyclone 
Sidr-inflicted injury (=1, 0 otherwise)   
244 0.566 0.497 
Independent Variables  
L(EXPSP) Log of self-protection expenditures (in Tk.) 84 7.967 1.67 
L(EXPSI) Log of self-insurance expenditures (in Tk.) 297 8.084 1.69 
L(PREINC) Log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 449 11.569 1.079 
L(PREINC2) Square of the log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH 
Income (in Tk.)   
449 135.02 25.28 
L(POSTINC) Log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 489 10.648 1.262 
L(POSTINC2) Square log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income 
(in Tk.) 
489 114.96 24.44 
AREA Area of homestead, crop land, and the pond 
(in decimal)  
500 142.6 24.441 
EMB If household is protected by the embankment 
(=1, 0 otherwise) 
497 0.6097 0.4883 
AGE Age of the respondent (in years) 497 42.221 13.252 
MFRATIO Male/ Female ratio of the household 498 1.248 0.7933 
CHILD Number of children in the household 500 1.26 1.1896 
MDIST Distance between the union and the mangrove 
forest (in km.) 
500 7.536 7.981 
MDIR If household is located to the south or the  
southwest direction relative to the coast and 
the Sundarban mangrove forest (=1, 0 
otherwise) 
500 0.548 0.498 
LGRELIEF Log of ex-post government sponsored 
disaster relief received (in Tk.) 
446 8.285 1.076 
LGREHABN Log of ex-post government sponsored 
disaster rehabilitation received (in Tk.) 
268 8.648 1.62 
SURGEHT Approximate average Cyclone Sidr induced 
Storm surge height (in meter) 
500 3.982 0.7085 
STORMEXP If household falls into counter-clockwise 
direction from Cyclone Sidr (=1, 0 otherwise) 
500 0.42 0.4941 
STORMDIS Directional Distance between Household and 
the Track for the Cyclone Sidr (in km)  
500 15.839 10.124 
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Table 5: Probit Model for Experiencing Storm-inflicted Health Problems   
Variables Parsimonious Model Add the Mangroves 
Characteristics 
Add the Ex-Ante 
Public Programs 
Add the Storm Surge 
Characteristics 
Coeff. Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.  Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.  Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.  Marginal 
Effect 
CONSTANT 15.561 
(0.72)
 
 
 
22.517 
(0.94)
 
 
24.569 
(1.02)
 
 
20.941 
(0.86)
 
 
EXPSP 2.26e-06 
(1.79)
** 
6.84 e-07
 
3.74 e-06 
(2.42)
*** 
1.03 e-07
 
3.74 e-06 
(2.38)
*** 
1.00 e-06
 
3.82 e-06 
(2.41)
*** 
1.02 e-06 
L(PREINC) -2.392 
(-0.66) 
-0.7226 -3.453 
(-0.86)
* 
-0.9467 
 
-3.685 
(-0.92) 
-0.9905 -3.078 
(-0.75) 
-0.8197 
L(PREINC2) 0.0919 
(0.59) 
0.0278 0.1297 
(0.77) 
0.0356 
 
0.1405 
(0.83) 
0.0378 0.1151 
(0.66) 
0.0306 
AREA -0.0002 
(-0.42)
 
-0.00006 
 
0.00006 
(0.11)
 
0.00001 
 
-0.00005 
(-0.09)
 
-0.00001
 
-0.00007 
(-0.13)
 
-0.00002 
 
DCOAST 0.0128 
(1.70)
** 
0.0039 
 
0.0168 
(1.12)
 
0.0046 
 
0.0044 
(0.26)
 
0.0012
 
0.0083 
(0.42)
 
0.0022
 
AGE -0.0056 
(-0.08)
 
-0.0017 
 
-0.0153 
(-0.21)
 
-0.0042 
 
-0.0089 
(-0.12)
 
-0.0024
 
-0.0045 
(-0.06)
 
-0.0012
 
AGE2 0.00004 
(0.05) 
0.00001 0.0001 
(0.15) 
0.00003 0.00009 
(0.12) 
0.00002 0.00005 
(0.06)
 
0.00001 
MFRATIO -0.5653 
(-2.24)
** 
-0.1708 
 
-0.8541 
(-2.68)
*** 
-0.2342
 
-0.9161 
(-2.84)
*** 
-02462
 
-0.8809 
(-2.63)
*** 
-0.2346
 
CHILD 0.2498 
(1.62)
* 
0.0755 0.2609 
(1.66)
** 
0.0715 
 
0.2570 
(1.62)
* 
0.0691
 
0.2615 
(1.58)
* 
0.0696
 
PROTECTED   -1.181 
(-1.51)
* 
-0.3239 
 
-1402 
(-1.74)
** 
-0.3769
 
-0.8947 
(-0.73)
 
-0.2383
 
MDIST   0.0519 
(1.11)
 
0.0142
 
0.0588 
(1.23)
 
0.0158
 
0.06551 
(1.27)
* 
0.0174 
MDIR   1.532 
(2.42)
*** 
0.4202 
 
1.816 
(2.70)
*** 
0.4880
 
1.845 
(2.71)
*** 
0.4913
 
EMB     -0.8380 
(-1.55)
* 
-0.2253
 
-0.8975 
(-1.01)
 
-0.2390
 
SURGEHT       -0.1015 
(-0.19)
 
-0.0270
 
STORMEXP       0.6597 
(0.59)
 
0.1757 
STORMDIS       -0.0212 
(-0.76)
 
-0.0057 
LOG LIKE. -46.664 -42.276 -40.953 -40.626 
LR Chi2 (df) 18.76
**
 (9) 27.54
**
 (12) 29.33
**
(13) 29.99
**
 (16) 
OBS. 87 87 86 86 
a. Dependent variable is the dummy variable regarding whether any household member is facing Cyclone Sidr-inflicted health 
impacts.   
b. For the Probit models, Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.  
Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
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Table 6: OLS for Medical Expenditures as a result of Storm-inflicted Health problems  
 
Variable Parsimonious model Add the Ex-post public programs 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT -1.837 
(-1.31)
* 
1.398 -0.9767 
(-0.62)
 
1.573 
L(EXPSI) 0.7849 
(30.24)
*** 
0.0259 0.8048 
 (22.12)
*** 
0.0364 
L(POSTINC) 0.9168 
(3.45)
*** 
0.2658 0.5452 
(1.87)
**      
0.2912 
L(POSTINC2) -0.0525 
(-3.85)
*** 
0.0137 -0.0319 
(-2.06)
** 
0.015 
L(AREA) -0.0001 
(-0.77)
 
0.0002 -0.0003 
(-0.85)
 
0.0003 
AGE -0.0119 
(-0.70)
 
0.0169 -7.291 
(-0.14)
 
0.0217 
AGE  SQUARED  0.00009 
(0.50) 
0.0002 -0.0058 
(-0.27) 
0.0002 
MFRATIO 0.0389 
(0.72)
 
0.0539 -672 e-06 
(-0.03)
 
0.0768 
CHILD -0.0223 
(-0.67)
 
0.0331 -0.0265 
(-0.68)
 
0.039 
LGRELIEF   0.0853 
(1.63)
* 
0.052 
LGREHABN   -0.0166 
(-0.48)
 
0.034 
R
2 
0.7791 0.7935 
Adj. R
2 
0.7726 0.7788 
F (df1,df2)
b 
119.47
***
 (8,271) 54.17
***
 (10, 141) 
OBS. 280 152 
RESET,  
F (df1,df2)
 c
  
35.20
***
 (3,268) 23.33
***
 (3, 138) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 
Test, p-value 
d
  
0.000 0.000 
a. Dependent variable is the log of medical expenditures for Cyclone Sidr-inflicted health losses; t-tests are shown in 
parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.  
b. Significant at 5% level. 
c. Regression specification error test for omitted variables. The F-values of the RESET tests for both model specifications 
confirm that there is ‘no’ omitted variable in the model.    
d. Testing for normality of residuals. The p-value is based on the assumptions that the distribution is normal. Since the p-
values are very small, we reject that the residuals are normally distributed.  
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Table 7: Probit Model for Experiencing Storm-inflicted Injury 
a
  
 
Variable Parsimonious model Add the Ex-post public programs 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
CONSTANT -0.1962 
(-0.07)
 
 -3.450 
(-0.91)
 
 
L(EXPSI) 0.17783 
(3.07)
*** 
0.0692 
(3.07)
*** 
0.2035 
(2.05)
** 
0.0777 
(2.05)
** 
L(POSTINC)
 
-0.1081 
(-0.20)
 
-0.0421 
(-0.20)
 
0.5727 
(0.85)
 
0.2187 
(0.85)
 
L(POSTINC2)
 
0.0009 
(0.03)
 
0.0003 
(0.03)
 
-0.0353 
(-0.98)
 
-0.0135 
(-0.98)
 
AREA 0.0012 
(2.27)
** 
0.0005 
(2.28)
** 
0.0007 
(0.89) 
0.0003 
(0.89) 
AGE -0.0026 
(-0.07)
 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.0274 
(-0.50) 
-0.0105 
(-0.50) 
AGE2 3.69 e-06 
(0.01) 
1.44 e-06 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.47) 
0.0001 
(0.47) 
MFRATIO -0.0381 
(-0.33)
 
-0.0148 
(-0.33) 
0.1424 
(0.69)
 
0.0544 
(0.69) 
CHILD 0.0179 
(0.26) 
0.007 
(0.26) 
-0.1567 
(-1.55)
* 
-0.0598 
(-1.55)
* 
LGRELIEF   0.3846 
(2.90)
*** 
0.1469 
(2.90)
*** 
LGREHABN   -0.2959 
(-3.31)
*** 
-0.1130 
(-3.30)
*** 
LOG-LIKE.
 
-148.419 -72.945 
LR CHI2 (df)
 
19.17
**
 (8) 20.52
**
 (10) 
Prob.> Chi2 ( 2 ) 0.014 0.0247 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0607 0.1233 
OBS. 232 124 
a. Dependent variable is the dummy variable regarding whether any household member is facing Cyclone Sidr inflicted injury 
b. Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
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Table 8: Marginal Willingness-to-Pay for reduction in Health-related Risks  
 
MWTP for risk reduction in 
health as a result of … 
MWTP expression 
in the model 
MWTP 
per household  
Total WTP for the 
entire study area 
(in million) 
an increase in households’ 
exposure to greater storm 
protection role of mangroves 
ij
ij
I
M



 
Taka 3372.23 or 
US $ 48.87 
Taka 12,443.38 or 
US $ 180.33 million 
an increase in households’ 
access to publicly constructed 
embankments 
ij
ij
I
G



 
Taka 2520.88 or 
US $ 36 
Taka 9302.05 or US 
$ 132.84 million 
an increase in households’ 
access to public post-disaster 
relief and rehabilitation 
programs 
ij
ij
I
R



 
Taka 249.72 or 
US $ 3.62 
Taka 921.47 or US $ 
13.35 million 
Notes on information used to derive MWTPs: 
a 
Marginal effects of 2 , 3 , 4 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 3 , are used based on results of the regression estimations from 
Tables 5,7, and 8. These marginal effects are considered following expressions (24)-(26) to perform an empirical 
analysis of the theoretical model.    
b 
Average self-protection expenditures = Tk. 94,549 and Average self-insurance expenditures = Tk. 18,776.07 
c 
Total population in the study area (in 2008) = 3.69 million 
d 
1 US $ = Tk. 69 at the time of the survey (in 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
